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Abstract
Prior studies have unveiled the vulnerability of the deep neural networks in the
context of adversarial machine learning, leading to great recent attention into
this area. One interesting question that has yet to be fully explored is the bias-
variance relationship of adversarial machine learning, which can potentially provide
deeper insights into this behaviour. The notion of bias and variance is one of the
main approaches to analyze and evaluate the generalization and reliability of a
machine learning model. Although it has been extensively used in other machine
learning models, it is not well explored in the field of deep learning and it is
even less explored in the area of adversarial machine learning. In this study, we
investigate the effect of adversarial machine learning on the bias and variance
of a trained deep neural network and analyze how adversarial perturbations can
affect the generalization of a network. We derive the bias-variance trade-off for
both classification and regression applications based on two main loss functions:
(i) mean squared error (MSE), and (ii) cross-entropy. Furthermore, we perform
quantitative analysis with both simulated and real data to empirically evaluate
consistency with the derived bias-variance tradeoffs. Our analysis sheds light on
why the deep neural networks have poor performance under adversarial perturbation
from a bias-variance point of view and how this type of perturbation would change
the performance of a network. Moreover, given these new theoretical findings, we
introduce a new adversarial machine learning algorithm with lower computational
complexity than well-known adversarial machine learning strategies (e.g., PGD)
while providing a high success rate in fooling deep neural networks in lower
perturbation magnitudes.
1 Introduction
Despite of the impressive achievements of deep learning over the past decade in different fields such as
computer vision [11, 14, 16, 25], machine translation [32, 33], and medicine [5, 6], their vulnerability
against adversarial machine learning brings different concerns regarding their robustness.
A perturbation  in a specific direction to the input causes the model to incorrectly classify the
input sample which can be preformed in both classification [19, 29] or regression problems [2, 31].
The perturbation  should be imperceptible by a human eye and as such, the norm of  is bounded
when a new perturbation is generated. Szegedy et al. introduced this drawback for deep neural
networks in their seminal paper [29]. They observed that the state-of-the-art deep neural networks
act poorly with high confidence when an imperceptible non-random perturbation is added to the
input image. They attributed this poor behaviour to the potential blind spots in the training of deep
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neural networks. Goodfellow et al. [10] argued this poor performance of deep neural networks on
adversarial examples is due to their linear behavior in high-dimensional spaces. Since then, there
have been several studies introducing different approaches to generate adversarial perturbation and
fool the deep neural networks [10, 12, 19, 22]. However, Madry et al. [18] proposed a multi-step
attack called the projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm which generalizes the prior first-order
adversarial machine learning algorithms and is able to produce adversarial examples that are harder
to learn and to defeat.
Parallel to introducing new adversarial machine learning algorithms, there has been a line of research
focusing on building defense mechanism against adversarial machine learning methods. Adversarial
training initially proposed by Goodfellow et al. [10] is one of the pioneer works which augments the
training set with adversarial examples to improve the network resilience against adversarial machine
learning algorithms. Kurakin et al. [15] extended this approach where they demonstrated the success
of this method for Inception v3 model [28] trained on the ImageNet dataset [26]. Furthermore,
they illustrated that one-step attacks like FGSM have a better transferability properties between
models as a black-box attack where the attacker does not have access to the parameters of the model.
Madry et al. [18] demonstrated that the higher the capacity of the deep neural network model, the
more resilient it is against adversarial attacks. The adversarial training method is further extended
by Liu et al. [17] (so-called Adv-BNN) where Bayesian techniques benefit the adversarial training
method to improve the robustness of the model. Besides adversarial training, other approaches such
as defensive distillation [23] generates a new set of soft training labels by replacing the Softmax
outputs of a neural network with a smoothed values. A new network with a similar architecture is
then trained using the new training set. Although this approach improves the robustness of the model
against some simpler adversarial machine learning methods, it behaves poorly against more recent
attacks like CW adversarial machine learning [4]. While the main focus of the adversarial machine
learning has been for classification tasks, several approaches have been proposed to apply them on
regression problems as well [3, 9, 21]. Sensory data is one of the main field of research for adversarial
machine learning algorithms with regression focus. For example, Ghafouri et al. [9] studied the
detection of adversarial attacks against cyber-physical systems (CPS) capable of manipulating sensor
readings.
Despite a rich literature developed in the field of adversarial machine learning, there has not been
enough theoretical studies on why neural networks are vulnerable in facing inputs perturbed with
adversarial perturbations. Zhang et al. [35] analyzed the robustness and accuracy trade-off in deep
neural networks. They illustrated that the side-effect of making a model robust against adversarial
machine learning via adversarial training is a drop in the accuracy of the model. They provided
an upper bound on the gap between the robustness and accuracy. As such, model generalization
is an important drawbacks of these techniques. Bias and Variance are one of the long-standing
and well-known procedure to analyze the generalization and reliability of machine learning mod-
els. The seminal work by Geman et al. [8] showed that while a model’s variance increases, the
model’s bias decreases monotonically with the increase in the model complexity. They derived a
well-formed decomposition of the bias and variance of the loss function for the regression learning
task. Domingos [7] extended the bias-variance decomposition to a more general loss functions such
as cross-entropy. However, obtaining a well-formed decomposition for a cross-entropy loss function
is more difficult than the case of mean squared error (MSE) loss function [7]. Recently, Neal et
al. [20] challenged the earlier findings of Geman et al. [8] by demonstrating that the variance for
deep neural networks does not necessarily increase as the network width increases. Followed by that,
a more recent work by Yang et al. [34] closed the gap between these two studies by showing that the
variance has a bell-shaped behaviour with the model complexity. In other words, as the width of the
network increases, the variance first starts to increase and then decreases. They backed their claim
with both theoretical analysis and empirical examples.
Although bias-variance trade-off has been used to justify some aspects of deep neural networks in
previous studies, to the best of authors’ knowledge, the theoretical analysis around the impact of the
adversarial machine learning algorithms on the bias and variance of a deep neural network has not
been well explored. In this paper, we aim to study the effect of adversarial machine learning on the
bias and variance of a deep neural network. Here, a new decomposition of the loss function in a deep
neural network is derived in terms of its bias and variance for both the regression and classification
tasks when the input sample is perturbed by an adversarial machine learning algorithm. Our main
contributions are as follow:
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• The bias and variance of a deep neural network facing adversarial perturbations is decom-
posed for both MSE and cross-entropy loss functions.
• The new derivations illustrate what should be the behavior of the adversarial machine
learning method to enforce the maximimum changes in the network’s loss function and
maximize the success rate.
• Extensive experimental results validate the new theoretical findings in the network’s bias
and variance theorem for both MSE and cross-entropy loss functions.
• A new adversarial machine learning method (so-called BV adversarial attack) is proposed
which is capable of fooling deep neural networks with comparable results with the state-of-
the-art algorithms but with higher efficiency and less computational complexity.
The proposed theorems illustrate that an adversarial machine learning algorithm can be designed in
such a way that attacks a model by only changing its behaviour in terms of either bias or variance.
This finding is also observed experimentally in the reported result of Figure 1 (c) for the case of MSE
for a regression problem. As such, the proposed theorems suggest that it is possible to design more
powerful adversarial machine learning algorithms which are much harder to be detected and resolved.
One interesting idea would be to design adversarial machine learning methods which only change the
model variance and only make the model unstable in specific cases and situations. As a result, they
might be very hard to identify as there is not any significant change in the model’s bias which make
them more disastrous.
2 Methodology
In this section we illustrate the effect of adversarial machine learning algorithms on the model’s bias
and variance and derive how the perturbation can change the behaviour of a model by studying its
bias and variance. Here we aim to study the bias-variance trade-off in deep neural networks based on
two well-know loss functions, MSE loss and cross-entropy loss.
2.1 Notation
‖x‖ denotes a generic norm function. Notations ‖x‖2, ‖x‖∞ refers to the l2 and l∞ norms respec-
tively. A set is denoted with capital letters such as X ,Y while vectors are denoted by small letters
such as x and y. The training set is denoted with D and the target function by f : X → Y . In case of
regression learning tasks, the set Y is a continuous one dimensional space while in the classification
task it contains discrete values. In our setting, a prediction model is denoted by fˆ which is an
estimation of the ground truth function f over the training set D. In order to consider adversarial
perturbation, we denote the perturbation added to each data sample x by an adversary with the vector
β(x). β(x) is not generated naturally and is designed specifically for each data sample and usually
has the property l∞
(
β(x)
)
< δ. Throughout our analysis, whenever we use the notation∇f(x), it is
the gradient of the function f with respect to x.
2.2 Case I: Regression with MSE Loss
Assume the goal is to estimate the target function f : X → Y . Each element x ∈ X has dimension
|x| = d. Given the training data, D = {(x1, y1), ..., (xm, ym)}, a learner produces a prediction
model fˆ(x). As such, the configuration of the parameters in fˆ(x) is dependent on the training data
D. Let us also assume the training data D is accompanied with a natural noise γ such that:
yi = f(xi) + γ (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m with m total number of data samples in D, and γ is a random variable where
E[γ] = 0, and E[γ2] = σ2γ . It is worth to note that, we keep this assumption mainly for the regression
task and we will drop it for the classification problems with cross-entropy loss function for simplicity.
Geman et al. [8] decomposed a MSE loss function in terms of its bias and variance of a prediction
model by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 For a prediction model fˆ(x) trained on the training data D to estimate the target
function f(x) with MSE loss function, the bias variance trade-off is [8]:
Ex,D,γ
[
(y − fˆ(x))2
]
= Ex,D
[(
ED
[
fˆ(x)
]− f(x))2]+ Ex,D [(fˆ(x)− ED [fˆ(x)])2]+ σ2γ
= Bias[fˆ ] + V ar[fˆ ] + V ar[γ]. (2)
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The V ar[γ] is the intrinsic noise of the system. Given (2), it is possible to break down and decouple
the effect of different factors on model performance based on the bias, variance and intrinsic noise
in the model. However, (2) does not take the effect of adversarial perturbation into account. The
perturbation β(x) added to each data sample x during the test time aims to increase the loss value
of the model. It is assumed that f(x) = f(x + β(x)), this assumption is to make sure the added
perturbation magnitude is reasonable and follows the imperceptibility of the adversarial perturbation.
This perturbation can have a great impact on the final loss which is significantly different from (2).
Following, we propose a new theorem to account for the adversarial perturbation in deriving bias and
variance of a model.
Theorem 2 Assume f¯(x) = ED[fˆ(x)] and the target function is f(x). The bias-variance trade-off
for MSE loss function with a prediction model fˆ(x) trained on dataset D with noise γ in the presence
of adversarial perturbation β(x) via the adversarial algorithm is:
Ex,D,γ
[
(y − fˆ(x+ β(x)))2
]
≈ Ex,D[(f(x)− f¯(x)− cx)2] + V ar[γ] + V ar[fˆ ] + Ex,D[c′x] (3)
where, cx = ∇f¯(x)Tβ(x) and, c′x = 2
(
fˆ(x)− f¯(x)
)((
∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x)
)T
β(x)
)
(4)
Proof: Given the adversarial perturbation β(x) with the condition l∞
(
β(x)
)
< δ during the test
time1,
Ex,D,γ
[
(y − fˆ(x+ β(x)))2
]
= Ex,D,γ
[
(f(x)− fˆ(x+ β(x)) + γ)2
]
= Ex,D
[
(f(x)− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ Ex,D [(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ σ2γ
≈ Ex,D
(f(x)− f¯(x)−∇f¯(x)Tβ(x))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias
+ Ex,D
(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ariance
+ σ2γ (5)
As seen in (14), cx = ∇f¯(x)T · β(x) is the new term added to the bias of the model because of the
adversarial perturbation. Next we expand the variance term in (14) to illustrate how the adversarial
perturbation affects the variance of the model:
Ex,D
[
(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2
]
≈ Ex,D
[(
fˆ(x)− f¯(x)
)2
+ 2(fˆ(x)− f¯(x))(∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x))Tβ(x)
]
= V ar[fˆ ] + Ex,D
[
2(fˆ(x)− f¯(x))(∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x))Tβ(x)
]
(6)

As illustrated, one important conclusion from the Theorem 2 is that the adversarial machine learning
increases the bias term (i.e., cx in (17)) and it can also increase the variance of the model by c′x
in (17). Experimental results verify these findings as well. The following corollaries are the direct
results of theorem 2.
Corollary I: The maximum expected increase in the bias of a model with MSE loss function for a
regression task is when the adversarial perturbation is added in the direction −∇f¯(x).
Corollary II: The maximum expected increase in the variance of a model trained for a regression
task with MSE loss function is when the adversarial perturbation is added in the direction of
(fˆ(x)− f¯(x))(∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x)).
2.3 Case II: Classification with cross-entropy Loss
The notion of bias and variance can be analyzed for the classification models trained with cross-
entropy loss as well. To this end, followed by the work done in [24, 34] let c be the number of classes
for classification and pˆiD(x) ∈ [0, 1]c be the output of a neural network trained on the training set D.
This function measures the confidence values over classes. Let pi(x) ∈ [0, 1]c be a one-hot vector
1The detailed derivation can be found in supplementary material.
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encoding ground truth label that we wish to estimate via pˆi. Then cross-entropy loss can be formulated
as:
L(pi, pˆi) = −Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(
pii(x) log pˆii(x)
)]
(7)
where pii(x) refers to ith component of the output vector pi(x). As explained in [24], the loss function
in (7) can be decomposed:
L(pi, pˆi) = Ex,D
[
DKL (pi(x)||pi∗(x)) +DKL (pi∗(x)||pˆi(x))
]
(8)
where pi∗(x) = arg minz ED [DKL(z||pˆi)]. pi∗(x) is the prediction model that has the minimum
expected KL-Divergence from the possible prediction models space. In other words, we can consider
it as the mean of the prediction model pˆi which is defined in terms of KL-Divergence. This perspective
which is further elaborated in Domingos’s seminal work [7] is somehow different from the mean
defined in the previous section for the regression task because of the cross-entropy loss function
form. As a result, it is possible to consider DKL(pi(x)||pi∗(x)) as the factor which drives the bias
and DKL(pi∗(x)||pˆi(x)) as the one deriving the variance in the model. However to account for the
adversarial perturbation instead of input x, the function pi∗(·) needs to be calculated for x+ β(x).
This leads to Theorem 3 which illustrates the behavior of a model trained based on cross-entropy
loss in the presence of adversarial perturbation β(x). It is assumed that the target function pi(x) is
constant on a small blob around x, and β(x) magnitude does not exceed the limits of that blob. In
other words, pi(x) = pi(x+ β(x)).
Theorem 3 Assume for input x, the ground truth class is tx. For a cross-entropy loss function, the
bias-variance tradeoff of a prediction model pˆi(x) with training data D for a target function pi(x) in
the presence of adversarial algorithm injecting perturbation β(x) to the system is:
L(pi, pˆi) = Ex,D
[
DKL(pi(x)||pi∗(x)) +DKL(pi∗(x)||pˆi(x))
]
+ Ex [cx] + Ex,D
[
c′x
]
(9)
where,
cx = −Ex
[(∇x log pi∗tx(x))Tβ(x)] c′x = −Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(∇xpi∗i (x) log pˆii(x)
pi∗i (x)
)T
β(x)
]
(10)
Proof: The proof can be found in the supplementary material.
This derivation is aligned with finding in [24, 34], where the bias variance decomposition for
cross-entropy loss function is in the form of KL-Divergence. The proposed theorem leads to the
following corollaries,
Corollary I: The maximum expected increase in the bias of a deep neural network trained with
cross-entropy loss is when the adversarial perturbation is in the direction of cx in (10).
Corollary II: The maximum expected increase in the variance of a deep neural network trained with
cross-entropy loss is when the adversarial perturbation is in the direction of c′x in (10).
2.4 BV Adversarial Machine Learning
Despite the fact that Theorem 3 provides a solid bias-variance decomposition and gives directions of
cx, c
′
x for maximum change on bias and variance of the system respectively, it is not computationally
feasible to calculate pi∗(x). As a result, in this section the cross-entropy loss function is analyzed in a
different way. This new finding leads to a novel adversarial machine learning algorithm which can be
used to fool models with less computational complexity and a reasonable success rate.
Given a classification problem with c classes, there is a set of score functions {fˆ1(x), fˆ2(x), ..., fˆc(x)}
which measure the possibility of assigning input x to each class 1, 2, ..., c respectively. These scores
are non-negative and encode the confidence of each function to assign the sample to the their
corresponding class labels.
For an input x ∈ X , let us assume there is a target function f(x) which maps the input x to the set
{1, 2, ..., c}. Define Xi = {x|x ∈ X ∧ f(x) = i} where i ∈ {1, ..., c}. Given a cross-entropy loss
function, the error of the prediction functions fˆi(x) for i ∈ {1, ..., c} of the target function f(x) is:
Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(
− log( fˆi(x)
fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x)
)
)
1f(x)=i
]
=
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
[
− log (fˆi(x))+ log (fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x))] .
(11)
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Algorithm 1: BV Attack for Multi-class classification with c classes
Data:
{(
x, y(x)
)|x ∈ D} with c distinct classes
Result: xˆ . Perturbed image x.
Input: fˆi i ∈ {1, ..., c}, . The prediction model scores for all classes.
, . The magnitude of perturbation.
x, . The input image.
y, . The ground truth label.
Begin
S = [−∇x log
(
fˆ1(x)
fˆ1(x)+...+fˆc(x)
)
, ...,−∇x log
(
fˆc(x)
fˆ1(x)+...+fˆc(x)
) ]
V =
[
li|li = 1y=i , i = 1, . . . , c
]
. The one-hot vector of the ground truth label.
xˆ = x+  STV
Return xˆ
End
As such, it is possible to decompose the cross-entropy loss function based on its bias and variance as
follow,
Theorem 4 The decomposition of the cross-entropy loss function for the prediction model constructed
by the set of functions {fˆ1(x), ..., fˆc(x)} with training data D and the target function f(x) with c
classes in the presence of adversarial perturbation of β(x) is:
Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(
− log( fˆi(x+ β(x))
fˆ1(x+ β(x)) + ...+ fˆc(x+ β(x))
)
)
1f(x)=i
]
≈
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
[
− log(fˆi(x)) + log(fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x)) + ci(x)
]
(12)
Where, ci(x) = −∇log
(
fˆi(x)
fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x)
)T
· β(x) s.t. Xi =
{
x|x ∈ X ∧ f(x) = i
}
. (13)
Proof: The proof is included in the supplementary material.
Given the derivation in (16), the maximum increase in the loss function for class i is reached when
the attacker attacks in the direction of −∇log
(
fˆi(x)
fˆ1(x)+...+fˆc(x)
)
for x ∈ Xi. As a result, while (16)
illustrates how the adversarial perturbation can affect the model’s loss decomposition, it also provides
the new terms ci(x) in the equation which gives the direction to maximize its attack on the prediction
model’s loss.
Motivated by that, using the direction vector ci(x) in Theorem 4, we can derive a new attack on the
prediction model. The procedure to perform the proposed attack (so-called BV attack) is summarized
in Algorithm 1 for multi-class classification task with c classes. It is assumed that each fˆi (i.e., the
confidence function for class i) outputs a non-negative value. This assumption is aligned with the
current design of deep neural networks for classifications, as the final output is usually passed through
the Softmax layer to be normalized.
The model’s gradient associated with the ground truth label of the input x is added to the input; and
the magnitude of the perturbation is controlled by the value of . However it is worth to note that
since the intrinsic properties of the proposed BV adversarial perturbation is different compared to
other adversarial machine learning method, it is not possible to compare the  in the proposed BV
method and other adversarial machine learning algorithms directly. As such, the competing methods
are compared based on the perturbation and the amount of noise they add to the input sample.
3 Experimental Results & Discussion
In this section, we examine the proposed theorems experimentally and illustrate how a deep neural
network behaves facing an adversarial machine learning algorithm based on its bias and variance.
To this end, we evaluate the theorem via different neural network architectures on both real datasets
including CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [13] and simulated data for both classification and regression
tasks.
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(a) Regression–FGSM Attack (b) Classification–FGSM Attack (c) Regression–Bias-Variance Attack
Figure 1: (a)–(b) The effect of FGSM adversarial machine learning on bias and variance for models
via the simulated data in both regression and classification tasks. (c) The BV adversarial machine
learning algorithm regression task when bias or variance perturbations derived in Theorem 2 is being
used to perturb the input sample.
3.1 Simulated Data
As the first experiment, the proposed theorems are evaluated based on the simulated data. For the
regression problem, samples (x, y), from a linear target function with natural noise of γ (generated
from a Uniform distribution) are generated. Each sample x ∈ R2 should be mapped to y ∈ R. A
simple feed forward neural network with one hidden layer of 100 units is used to learn the target
function. 5 experiments with different seeds are performed to measure the bias and variance of the
model given the perturbed samples by FGSM adversarial attacks (Figure 1 (a)).
A similar experiment is performed for classification task as well. The simulated samples for two
classes (x ∈ R50, y ∈ {0, 1}) are generated from Normal distributionsN (0, 1) andN (10, 1) to have
enough separability between two class labels. The training samples are modeled with a feed forward
network logistic regression model with two hidden layers with sizes [50, 100]. This trained model is
attacked by FGSM. Figure 1 (b) demonstrates the experimental results. As seen, by increasing the
attack (i.e., increasing the ) the bias and variance of the models are increased which is aligned by
the proposed theorems. The experiment is performed when model is trained without any adversarial
training and when it is trained by PGD or BV adversarial training techniques.
As the last experiment, the findings in Theorem 2 is analyzed experimentally. To do so, the regression
model trained in the first experiment is attacked by the perturbations derived in Theorem 2. As seen
in Figure 1 (c), perturbing the input sample by −∇f¯(x) (i.e., Bias attack) enforces the maximum
bias change in the model while using (fˆ(x)− f¯(x))(∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x)) (i.e., Variance attack) would
change the model variance with a minimum change in the model’s bias. This experiment validates
our finding in Theorem 2 experimentally.
3.2 Real Data & BV Adversarial Attack Algorithm
In this section, we study the effect of adversarial machine learning algorithms on real datasets. To this
end, we take advantage of adversarial training techniques during the training to improve the robustness
of the examined models. Four different deep neural networks including ResNet-18 [11], ResNet-34,
ResNet-502 and MobileNetV2 [27] is used to conduct the experimental result for CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets. Each experiment is repeated by 5 different seeds to be able to calculate the bias
and variance for the models, properly.
Figure 3 shows the experimental results. Columns (a) demonstrates the effect of different adversarial
machine learning methods on the accuracy of four examined adversarial machine learning algorithms
when they are trained via a regular training approach3. Since the intrinsic behaviour of  in the
evaluated adversarial machine learning methods are different, the examined models’ accuracy are
compared based on the perturbation level of the perturbed input samples which is measured by
the MSE difference of the ground truth image and the perturbed one. As seen, by increasing the
perturbation level the model’s accuracy drops (i.e., change in the model bias), the model variance
is increased as well. One interesting observation is that while the variance of the loss value keeps
increasing with the perturbation level, the variance of the accuracy starts to decrease when the
perturbation passes a threshold. That is due to the fact that extreme perturbation level causes the
model to have almost zero accuracy which is also visible in Figure 3 and as such there is not
significant changes in the variance. This result is consistent with the bias-variance tradeoff presented
in Theorem 3 and 4. Columns (b)–(d) show the same experiment when an adversarial training
2Here we report the results for two models and the complete experimental results can be found in the
supplementary material.
3The behaviour of loss functions for the examined models are included in the supplementary material.
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(a) ResNet18–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet18–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet18–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet18–PGD Adv-Training
(a) MobileNetV2–Basic Training (b) MobileNetV2–FGSM Adv-Training (c) MobileNetV2–BV Adv-Training (d) MobileNetV2–PGD Adv-Training
Figure 2: The effect of training with FGSM, PGD, and BV on bias and variance of the accuracy
on CIFAR-10 dataset against adversarial attacks. Basic training refers to training without using
adversarial examples.
technique is used during training of the model. The results illustrate that using the adversarial
training technique improves the robustness of the model and leads to lower bias while facing
higher perturbation compared to the a regular training approach. Furthermore, the result shows that
adversarial training technique can benefit the model and reduces the model variance given different
perturbation levels.
Figure 3 also demonstrates the comparison results of the proposed BV adversarial attack compared
to three state-of-the-art adversarial machine learning algorithms including FGSM [10], PGD [18]
and Adv-BNN [17] methods. The methods are evaluated by different adversarial training approaches
shown in columns (b)–(d). As seen, the proposed BV algorithm provides higher success rates in
fooling the networks within lower perturbation levels. It is worth to note that PGD and Adv-BNN
are iterative algorithms in generating the perturbation while FGSM and the proposed BV algorithm
generate the perturbation in one step. As such, PGD and Adv-BNN methods have a higher success
rate when the perturbation level is increased. Moreover, the computational complexity of the proposed
BV adversarial attacks is as low as FGSM’s computational complexity, while it outperforms FGSM
significantly. Furthermore, the proposed BV method is k times faster than multi-step attacks such as
PGD where k is the number of inner iterations of PGD attack, while BV produces higher success rate
in lower perturbation levels. This benefits the model even more when the proposed method is being
used in the adversarial training step as it reduces the training time significantly.
The details of the experimental setup including the hyper-parameters setting and the results for
CIFAR-100 dataset are reported in the supplementary material.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the effect of adversarial machine learning on a model’s bias and variance. We
proposed a new set of theorems which decompose the effect of adversarial perturbations on machine
learning models trained with two well-known loss functions of MSE and cross-entropy. The new
derivations showed when to expect the maximum increase in the bias and variance of the model
facing adversarial machine leanings. While the theorems verify the previous findings in this field
which the model is vulnerable in the opposite direction of gradient of loss function, the proposed
theorems can quantify what is the best direction for adversarial perturbation to maximize the effect.
The proposed theorems can help us to better understand the effect of adversarial machine learning
algorithms in the field of deep neural networks and hopefully benefit the field to resolve this concern.
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Moreover, motivated by the new findings, we proposed a new adversarial machine learning method
so-call BV adversarial attack which can fool deep neural network with a reasonable success rate
compared to other state-of-the-art algorithms with a less computational complexity. Experimental
results showed that the proposed attack can fool the network with a higher success rate while adds a
lower perturbations to the input image compared to the state-of-the-art methods.
5 Broader Impact
Adversarial machine learning poses serious challenges for deep neural networks [1, 10] to behave
erroneously in the presence of adversarial perturbation. With the rise in prevalence of deep neural
networks being used in real-world mission-critical applications ranging from video surveillance and
autonomous driving cars to biometric recognition and financial trading, adversarial machine learning
can cause serious negative socioethical concerns as well as physical harm when leveraged with
malicious intent. In this work, we present a theory to help in understanding the impact of adversarial
machine learning on both the variance and bias of the system, and for the first time illustrate how
adversarial perturbations can manipulate the variance of the system besides its bias. We believe that
these types of theoretical insights will give us a deeper understanding how these mechanisms lead
deep neural networks to become vulnerable facing adversarial perturbation. Knowing how deep
neural networks fail under adversarial machine learning will allow the community to discover new
ways to defend against them and improve their robustness to such perturbations in order to build more
reliable deep neural networks to use in real-world scenarios that impact society at large.
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6 Theorems and Derivations
Theorems 2 and 3 in the main manuscript derive the bias-variance trade-off for the MSE and
cross-entropy loss functions in the presence of an adversarial perturbation. Theorem 4 derives the
bias-variance decomposition of the cross-entropy loss function of a prediction model constructed
by the set of functions in the presence of adversarial perturbation, which provides a direction which
maximizes the loss. This new decomposition inspired the proposed BV adversarial machine learning
algorithm. Below the detailed derivation and proofs of the proposed theorems are provided.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Given the adversarial perturbation β(x) with the condition l∞
(
β(x)
)
< δ and the assumption that
f(x+ β(x)) = f(x), the MSE loss can be decomposed as follows:
Ex,D,γ
[
(y − fˆ(x+ β(x)))2
]
= Ex,D,γ
[
(f(x)− fˆ(x+ β(x)) + γ)2
]
= Ex,D,γ
[
(f(x)− f¯(x+ β(x)) + f¯(x+ β(x))− fˆ(x+ β(x)) + γ)2
]
= Ex,D
[
(f(x)− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ Ex,D [(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ σ2γ
+ 2Eγ [γ]Ex,D
[
(f(x)− f¯(x+ β(x)) + (f¯(x+ β(x))− fˆ(x+ β(x)))
]
+ 2Ex
[
(f(x)− f¯(x+ β(x))× ED
[
(f¯(x+ β(x))− fˆ(x+ β(x)))
]]
= Ex,D
[
(f(x)− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ Ex,D [(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ σ2γ
≈ Ex,D
[(
f(x)− f¯(x)−∇f¯(x)Tβ(x))2]+ Ex,D [(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]+ σ2γ
(14)
In (14), we are using the fact that Eγ [γ] = 0 and ED
[
(f¯(x+ β(x))− fˆ(x+ β(x)))
]
= 0.
Also for the term Ex,D
[
(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2
]
in (14), by using Taylor polynomial of
order one [30], we have:
Ex,D
[
(fˆ(x+ β(x))− f¯(x+ β(x)))2]
]
≈ Ex,D
[(
fˆ(x)− f¯(x)
)2
+ 2(fˆ(x)− f¯(x))(∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x))Tβ(x)
]
= V ar[fˆ ] + Ex,D
[
2(fˆ(x)− f¯(x))(∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x))Tβ(x)
]
(15)
Putting together (15) and (14), we have:
Ex,D,γ
[
(y − fˆ(x+ β(x)))2
]
≈ Ex,D[(f(x)− f¯(x)− cx)2] + V ar[γ] + V ar[fˆ ] + Ex,D[c′x] (16)
where, cx = ∇f¯(x)Tβ(x) and, c′x = 2
(
fˆ(x)− f¯(x)
)((
∇fˆ(x)−∇f¯(x)
)T
β(x)
)
(17)

Proof of Theorem 3:
Assuming that for input x, the ground truth class is tx. By using Taylor polynomial of order one [30],
the loss can be decomposed as follow:
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L(pi, pˆi) = Ex,D [DKL(pi(x)||pi∗(x+ β(x))) +DKL(pi∗(x+ β(x))||pˆi(x+ β(x)))]
= −Ex
[
log pi∗tx(x+ β(x))
]− Ex,D [ c∑
i=1
pi∗i (x+ β(x)) log
pˆii(x+ β(x))
pi∗i (x+ β(x))
]
= −Ex
[
log pi∗tx(x)
]− Ex,D [ c∑
i=1
pi∗i (x) log
pˆii(x)
pi∗i (x)
]
− Ex
[(∇x log pi∗tx(x))Tβ(x)]− Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(∇xpi∗i (x) log pˆii(x)pi∗i (x))Tβ(x)
]
= Ex,D
[
DKL(pi(x)||pi∗(x)) +DKL(pi∗(x)||pˆi(x))
]
− Ex
[(∇x log pi∗tx(x))Tβ(x)]− Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(∇xpi∗i (x) log pˆii(x)pi∗i (x))Tβ(x)
]
(18)

Proof of Theorem 4:
Here, as we have the assumption that the perturbation β(x) does not change the ground-truth class of
x, by using Taylor polynomial of order one [30], the loss can be decomposed as follows:
Ex,D
[
c∑
i=1
(
− log( fˆi(x+ β(x))
fˆ1(x+ β(x)) + ...+ fˆc(x+ β(x))
)
)
1f(x)=i
]
=
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
[
− log (fˆi(x+ β(x)))+ log (fˆ1(x+ β(x)) + ...+ fˆc(x+ β(x)))]
≈
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
[
− log(fˆi(x)) + log(fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x))
]
+
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
(−∇fˆi(x)
fˆi(x)
+
∇fˆ1(x) + ...+∇fˆc(x)
fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x)
)T
β(x)

=
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
[
− log(fˆi(x)) + log(fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x))
]
+
c∑
i=1
Ex∈Xi,D
−∇log( fˆi(x)
fˆ1(x) + ...+ fˆc(x)
)T
β(x)

(19)

7 Experimental Setup
The image samples of both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets [13], are normalized by the mean
[0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465] and standard deviation [0.2023, 0.1994, 0.2010] for the three RGB channels.
The experimental results were done for all networks including ResNet18, ResNet34, ResNet50 [11]
and MobileNetV2 [27] in two different setups of with adversarial training and no adversarial training.
The  = 0.05 and  = 0.02 were used for adversarial training with FGSM [10] and PGD [18],
respectively, while the number of iterations for generative PGD perturbation was set to 5. For
adversarial training with BV,  was set to 2.5. These epsilons are chosen based on the grid-search.
It is also worth to mention that to make a fair comparison of different adversarial training, it was
made sure that adversarial training with different algorithms resulted to a similar amount l2 norm
perturbation on the input image (equal to the square root of MSE difference of the ground truth image
and the perturbed one.).
For evaluating different method in the test time, and comparing the effect of adversarial perturbation
on the trained models, the range of  for each perturbation is determined such that it injects the same
amount of perturbation (measured by the MSE difference of the ground truth image and the perturbed
one) compared to other perturbations. Moreover, since adversarial trained models had more resilient
against adversarial perturbation, we used higher range of  to perform adversarial perturbation on the
models in the test time compared to the model with no adversarial training. All experiments were
repeated 5 times with 5 difference seed values to obtain reliable variances.
11
8 Experimental Results
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, shows the comprehensive experimental results for two datasets of CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 against 4 different deep neural network models. To better analyze the impact of
adversarial perturbation on the model’s bias and variance, the changes in both accuracy and loss
values for the models are reported given different perturbation levels. Figures 3 and 4 depict the
impact of adversarial perturbation on the accuracy of the models for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 while
the next two Figures reports the changes in the loss function for the same experiments.
Column (a) in all Figures shows the performance of models with no adversarial training while the
other Columns demonstrates the robustness of models against different adversarial machine learning
algorithms when they are trained with FGSM (Column (b)), BV (Column (c)) and PGD adversarial
training (Column (d)). As discussed in the main paper, the adversarial training makes the model more
resilient against adversarial perturbation and the accuracy drops slower compared to when there is
no adversarial training. It is also evident by the results that the variance of the accuracy of different
models (Figures 3 and 4), first starts to increase and then decreases since the perturbation with very
high perturbation causes almost zero accuracy which results in a small variance. On the other hand,
for loss values (Figures 5 and 6), the variance in almost all cases keep increasing. The reason why
the changes in the variances cannot be clearly seen in the plots for the loss values is that it is small
compared to the increase in the bias of the loss.
The experimental results show that the BV algorithm is able to attack the targeted model and fool it
properly which results to a higher drop in accuracy than other adversarial machine learning algorithms
for smaller perturbations. Nevertheless, multi-step perturbations like PGD or Adv-BNN are more
effective on higher perturbation levels. The experimental results demonstrates the effectiveness
of the proposed adversarial perturbation algorithm while they also consistent with the proposed
theorems in analyzing the deep neural networks’ bias and variance against adversarial machine
learning algorithms.
It is also wroth to mention that the experimental results are aligned with the findings introduced
in [18]. As seen, a network with higher capacity (e.g., ResNet-50) shows a higher level of robustness
against multi-step attacks like PGD and provide slower accuracy drop rate when the perturbation
level is being increased. This is evident by Figures 3 and 4.
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(a) ResNet18–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet18–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet18–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet18–PGD Adv-Training
(a) MobileNetV2–No Adversarial Training (b) MobileNetV2–FGSM Adv-Training (c) MobileNetV2–BV Adv-Training (d) MobileNetV2–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet34–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet34–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet34–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet34–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet50–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet50–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet50–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet50–PGD Adv-Training
Figure 3: The effect of training with FGSM, PGD, and BV on bias and variance of the accuracy on
CIFAR-10 dataset against the competing adversarial perturbations. No Adversarial Training refers to
training without using adversarial examples.
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(a) ResNet18–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet18–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet18–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet18–PGD Adv-Training
(a) MobileNetV2–No Adversarial Training (b) MobileNetV2–FGSM Adv-Training (c) MobileNetV2–BV Adv-Training (d) MobileNetV2–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet34–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet34–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet34–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet34–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet50–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet50–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet50–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet50–PGD Adv-Training
Figure 4: The effect of training with FGSM, PGD, and BV on bias and variance of the accuracy on
CIFAR-100 dataset against adversarial perturbations.
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(a) ResNet18–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet18–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet18–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet18–PGD Adv-Training
(a) MobileNetV2–No Adversarial Training (b) MobileNetV2–FGSM Adv-Training (c) MobileNetV2–BV Adv-Training (d) MobileNetV2–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet34–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet34–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet34–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet34–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet50–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet50–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet50–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet50–PGD Adv-Training
Figure 5: The effect of training with FGSM, PGD, and BV on bias and variance of the Loss on
CIFAR-10 dataset against adversarial perturbations.
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(a) ResNet18–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet18–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet18–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet18–PGD Adv-Training
(a) MobileNetV2–No Adversarial Training (b) MobileNetV2–FGSM Adv-Training (c) MobileNetV2–BV Adv-Training (d) MobileNetV2–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet34–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet34–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet34–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet34–PGD Adv-Training
(a) ResNet50–No Adversarial Training (b) ResNet50–FGSM Adv-Training (c) ResNet50–BV Adv-Training (d) ResNet50–PGD Adv-Training
Figure 6: The effect of training with FGSM, PGD, and BV on bias and variance of the Loss on
CIFAR-100 dataset against adversarial perturbations.
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